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1. Introduction15
Contests are used widely in economics and political theory. Specic applications include marketing,16
rent-seeking, campaigning, military conict, and sports, for instance.1 A useful contest technology,17
conveniently parameterized by a parameter r 2 (0;1), has been popularized by Tullock (1980). Pure-18
strategy Nash equilibria have been identied for low values of r (Mills, 1959; Pérez-Castrillo and19
Verdier, 1992; Nti, 1999, 2004; Cornes and Hartley, 2005), and mixed-strategy equilibria for high20
values of r (Baye et al., 1994; Alcade and Dahm, 2010; Ewerhart, 2015, 2016). For intermediate values21
of r and heterogeneous valuations, Wang (2010) has constructed additional equilibria in which only22
one player randomizes.23
The present paper complements and, in a sense, completes the equilibrium analysis of Tullocks24
model in the important special case of two players and heterogeneous valuations. We rst show25
that, for r  2, the equilibrium is unique. This observation is useful because for r > 2, the usual26
equilibrium characteristics, such as expected e¤orts, participation probabilities, winning probabilities,27
expected payo¤s, and revenue, are known to be independent of the equilibrium. Then, we document the28
properties of the equilibrium, including rent-dissipation, comparative statics, and robustness. Finally,29
as an application, we prove a revenue ranking result for optimally biased contests.30
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation and reviews31
existing equilibrium characterizations. Section 3 presents our uniqueness result. Comparative statics32
are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 deals with robustness. Optimal discrimination is examined in33
Section 6. An Appendix contains an auxiliary result.34
2. Set-up and notation35
There are two players i = 1; 2. Player is valuation of the prize is denoted by Vi, where we assume36
V1  V2 > 0. Given e¤orts x1  0 for player 1 and x2  2 for player 2, player is probability of winning37
is specied as38
pi(x1; x2) =
xri
xr1 + x
r
2
, (1)39
where r 2 (0;1), and the ratio is replaced by p0i = 0:5 should the denominator vanish.2 Player is40
payo¤ is given by i = piVi   xi. This denes the two-player contest C = C(V1; V2; r).41
A mixed strategy i for player i is probability measure on [0; Vi]. Let Mi denote the set of42
player is mixed strategies. Given  = (1; 2) 2M1M2, we write pi(1; 2) = E[pi(x1; x2)j] and43
1Cf. Konrad (2009).
2The assumption on p0i will be relaxed in Section 5.
2
i(1; 2) = E[i(x1; x2)j], where E[ j] denotes the expectation operator. An equilibrium is a44
pair  = (1; 2) 2 M1 M2 satisfying 1(1; 2)  1(1; 2) for any 1 2 M1 and 2(1; 2) 45
2(

1; 2) for any 2 2M2.46
For an equilibrium  = (1; 2), we dene player is expected e¤ort xi = E[xiji ], participa-47
tion probability i = i (fxi > 0g), winning probability pi = pi(1; 2), and expected payo¤48
i = p

iVi  xi, as well as the designers revenue R = x1 + x2. An equilibrium  is an all-pay auc-49
tion equilibrium if it shares these characteristics with the unique equilibrium of the corresponding50
all-pay auction (Alcade and Dahm, 2010).51
Let ! = V2=V1. The following three propositions summarize much of the existing equilibrium52
characterizations.53
Proposition 1. (Mills, 1959; Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992; Nti, 1999, 2004; Cornes54
and Hartley, 2005) A pure-strategy equilibrium exists if and only if r  1 +!r. This equilibrium is55
interior, and unique within the class of pure-strategy equilibria.356
Proposition 2. (Baye et al., 1994; Alcade and Dahm, 2010; Ewerhart, 2015, 2016) For any57
r  2, there exists an all-pay auction equilibrium. Moreover, for r > 2, any equilibrium is an all-pay58
auction equilibrium, and both players randomize.59
Proposition 3 (Alcade and Dahm, 2010; Wang, 2010). For any r 2 (1 + !r; 2], there exists an60
equilibrium in which player 1 chooses a pure strategy, while player 2 randomizes between zero and a61
positive e¤ort.62
For convenience, the cases captured by Propositions 1 through 3, respectively, will be referred to as63
the pure, mixed, and semi-mixed cases. See Figure 1 for illustration.464
65
Figure 1: The parameter space.66
3For homogeneous valuations and r  2, the equilibrium is known to be unique even within the class of all equilibria.
4Note the overlap between the cases. Indeed, for r = 2 and ! = 1, the all-pay auction equilibrium is in pure strategies.
Further, for r = 2 and ! < 1, the semi-mixed equilibrium is an all-pay auction equilibrium.
3
3. Uniqueness67
The following result is key to all what follows.68
Proposition 4. For any r  2, there is precisely one equilibrium.69
Proof. Assume rst that r  1 + !r. By Proposition 1, there exists an interior pure-strategy70
equilibrium (x1; x2). Moreover, the only candidate for an alternative best response to x1 is the zero71
bid (Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992; Cornes and Hartley, 2005). Since equilibria in contests are72
interchangeable (cf. the Appendix), the support of any alternative equilibrium strategy must be a73
subset of f0; x2g. However, player 1s rst-order necessary condition for the interior optimum,74
@p1(x

1; x

2)
@x1
V12   1 = 0, (2)75
holds for 2 = 1, so that it cannot hold for 2 < 1. By an analogous argument, necessarily 1 = 176
and, hence, the equilibrium is unique in this case. Assume next that r > 1 + !r. By Proposition 3,77
there exists a semi-mixed equilibrium in which player 1 uses a pure strategy x1 > 0, while player 278
randomizes, choosing some x2 = x2 with probability 2 2 (0; 1), and x2 = 0 otherwise. As above,79
it follows that player 2s best-response set is f0; x2g. Any alternative equilibrium strategy could,80
therefore, only use a di¤erent probability 2 of randomization across the set f0; x2g. But this is81
impossible in view of (2), which must hold also in the semi-mixed case. Moreover, by the construction82
of the semi-mixed equilibrium (Alcade and Dahm, 2010; Wang, 2010), player 1s best-response set83
is the same as in the associated pure-strategy equilibrium in the contest bC = C(bV1; V2; r), with bV1 =84
V2=(1   r)1=r. Hence, x1 is the unique best response, and uniqueness of the equilibrium follows as85
above. 86
Proposition 4 implies, in particular, that for r = 2, there does not exist any equilibrium other than87
the all-pay auction equilibrium identied by Alcade and Dahm (2010, Ex. 3.3).588
Dene rent dissipation as the fraction i = xi=Vi of the valuation spent by player i. In the pure89
and mixed cases, i is known to be identical for the two players, with   1 = 2 being strictly90
increasing in !. As noted by Wang (2010), this extends to the semi-mixed case, where91
 = (r)
!
2
, (3)92
5Unfortunately, however, the argument does not deliver uniqueness for r > 2 because the best-response set is countably
innite in that case.
4
with93
(r) =
2
r
(r   1) r 1r : (4)94
The present analysis shows that  is globally strictly increasing in ! for any r 2 (0;1), regardless of95
the equilibrium.96
4. Comparative statics97
Table I provides an overview of the comparative statics of the equilibrium.6 As can be seen, the98
comparative statics of the semi-mixed equilibrium with respect to V1 and V2 is identical to that of99
the all-pay auction. The comparative statics of the semi-mixed equilibrium with respect to r is as100
follows. As the contest becomes more decisive, expected e¤orts, player 2s participation probability,101
and revenue are all strictly declining towards the respective all-pay auction levels. In contrast, player102
1s winning probability and expected payo¤ are both strictly increasing towards the respective all-pay103
auction levels.104
105
Table I: Comparative statics.106
One can check that all the equilibrium characteristics listed in the table depend continuously on107
parameters. In other words, there are no jumps in the possible transitions between pure, semi-mixed,108
and mixed equilibria. This allows deriving global comparative statics results. For example, Yildirim109
(2015) has made the intuitive observation that, if the contest technology exhibits decreasing returns,110
the weaker player never prefers a more decisive contest. But, as d2=dr  0 holds globally, the same111
conclusion holds for technologies with constant or increasing returns.112
6The table summarizes and extends the results of Nti (1999, 2004), Wang (2010), and Yildirim (2015).
5
5. Robustness113
So far, we assumed that p01 = p
0
2 = 0:5. However, as our next result shows, this assumption is not114
crucial.115
Proposition 5. The equilibrium set remains unchanged when p01; p
0
2 2 [0; 1] and p01 + p02  1.116
Proof. Let  = (1; 2) be an equilibrium under the modied rules that is not an equilibrium in C.117
Since mutual inactivity cannot occur with positive probability in , some player i nds a deviation118
to zero protable in C, but not protable under the modied rules. Moreover, j , with j 6= i, must119
have an atom at zero, and p0i < 0:5. But then, player i has a protable deviation to some small xi > 0120
both in C and under the modied rules. Contradiction! Conversely, suppose that  = (1; 2) is121
an equilibrium in C that is not an equilibrium under the modied rules. Then some player i nds122
a deviation to zero protable under the modied rules, yet not protable in C. Moreover, player js123
mixed strategy j , with j 6= i, necessarily has an atom at zero. Given Propositions 1 and 4, this is124
feasible only if i = 1 and r > 1 +!r. In the semi-mixed case, however, bidding zero yields a payo¤ for125
player 1 of126
1 = p
0
1V1(1  2)  V1(1  2) = V1  
V2
(r   1)1=r , (5)127
which is weakly less than128
1 =

2
(x1)r
(x1)r + (x2)r
+ 1  2

V1   x1 = V1  
2(r   1) r 1r
r
V2, (6)129
because 2(r  1)=r  1. Similarly, in the mixed case, 1 = V1  V2, whereas a deviation to zero yields130
only 1 = p01V1(1  2)  V1   V2. Contradiction! 131
6. Optimally biased contests132
Suppose now that a designer may inate or deate player 2s e¤ort by a factor  > 0. I.e., players133
probabilities of winning are given in the interior by134
p1(x1; x2) =
xr1
xr1 + (x2)
r
(7)135
and p2 = 1   p1 . Let () denote the rent-dissipation in the contest C = C(V 1 ; V 2 ; r), where136
V 1 = maxfV1; V2g and V 2 = minfV1; V2g. Since players act as if in C, the revenue from the137
6
biased contest is given by138
R() = (V1 + V2)(). (8)139
Franke et al. (2014) obtained a dominance result. Epstein et al. (2013) compared pure-strategy140
equilibria directly with all-pay auction equilibria. The following result ranks a continuum of contest141
technologies, explicitly taking into account the possibility of semi-mixed equilibria.142
Proposition 6. For any r 2 (0;1), the revenue-maximizing bias is  = 1=!, with143
R() = minfr
2
; 1g  V1 + V2
2
(9)144
Thus, the revenue from the optimally biased contest is strictly increasing for r  2, and constant for145
r  2.146
Proof. Suppose rst that r  2. In a pure-strategy equilibrium, maximizing147
R() = rV
r
1 (V2)
r(V1 + V2)
(V r1 + 
rV r2 )
2
(10)148
yields the solution  = 1=!, with R() = (r=4)  (V1 + V2). For a semi-mixed equilibrium,149
R() =
8><>:
!
2 (r)(V1 + V2) if ! < (r   1)1=r
1
2!(r)(V1 + V2) if ! > (r   1) 1=r.
(11)150
In the rst case, R() is strictly increasing in . In the second case, R() is strictly declining in .151
Hence, it is strictly suboptimal to implement a semi-mixed equilibrium. For r > 2, the claim has been152
proved by the author in prior work (2016). 153
Appendix A. An auxiliary result154
Two equilibria (1; 2) and (1 ; 2 ) are called interchangeable if (1; 2 ) and (1 ; 2) are equi-155
libria as well.156
Lemma A.1. Equilibria in two-player contests are interchangeable.157
Proof. The proof is a straightforward adaptation on an argument detailed in Klumpp and Polborn158
(2006, p. 1104), and therefore omitted. 159
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